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Abstract
This paper considers the role of accounts of inferential processes in the stylistic
analysis of texts. It approaches this question by considering the range of contributions
an account of inferential processes might make to the stylistic analysis of William
Golding’s 1955 novel The Inheritors. It considers what such an account might add to
insights already provided by previous analyses, including Halliday’s famous (1971)
analysis and Hoover’s more recent (1999) corpus-based work, both of which say
relatively little about inferential processes. This paper suggests that an account of
inferential processes is in principle a vital part of any adequate account of how texts
create effects, even though it is not always practical to offer a detailed account. In
some cases, including the case of The Inheritors, the nature of the inferential
processes which the text gives rise to makes an important contribution to how we
understand and respond to the text.
Keywords: Golding, William; inference; inferential processes; The Inheritors;
pragmatics; stylistics
Introduction
This paper considers the role of accounts of inferential processes in the stylistic
analysis of texts. The main aim is to consider what kinds of contribution a discussion of
inferential processes can make to stylistic analyses. It approaches this question by
considering a text, William Golding’s 1955 novel The Inheritors, which has been
analysed very successfully without much reference to the inferential processes of
readers. Section 1 considers the role of inferential processes, and accounts of
inferential processes, in understanding communicative acts in general. While most
3communicators in most communicative acts do not think consciously about the
inferential processes they are engaged in, the nature of some communicative acts
makes aspects of the inferential processes more salient and sometimes it is hard,
arguably impossible, not to notice them. Three kinds of cases are discussed here.
Section 2 considers what is involved in describing and explaining such inferences. The
discussion is based on the framework of Relevance Theory, although the questions
explored in this paper are independent of any particular semantic or pragmatic
framework. Section 3 considers the role of accounts of inferential processes in stylistic
analysis and outlines several positions that might be taken with regard to the role such
accounts could play. Two extreme positions, that inferential processes must always be
discussed or need never be discussed, are ruled out. Section 4 considers previous
stylistic analyses of The Inheritors, focusing mainly on Halliday’s (1971) and Hoover’s
(1999) analyses. Both Halliday’s and Hoover’s analyses help to explain how the book
creates effects for readers. Both raise questions which might be addressed by an
account of readers’ inferential processes. While not providing a detailed pragmatic
analysis himself, Hoover acknowledges the contribution an account of inference could
make and suggests that such an account would help to explain the effects of the text.
Section 5 considers some ways in which more detailed accounts of inferential
processes might help to explain interpretations of the text and suggests that important
effects of the text can be understood by considering fairly salient differences in the
kinds of inferential processes readers are likely to engage in when reading different
sections of the book. The conclusions presented in section 6 are that an account of
inferential processes is in principle a vital part of any adequate account of how texts
are interpreted, even though it is not always practical to develop a detailed account,
and that in some cases effects are derived because of the salient nature of the
inferential processes themselves.
41 Inference in general
This section considers the role of inferential processes in everyday communication. It is
widely acknowledged that understanding each other, including understanding spoken
or written verbal communication, involves inference. It is also widely assumed that
most communicators do not give much attention to the role of inference. But there are
cases where acts of communication draw attention to inferential processes in such a
way that we cannot help noticing them. Inferences in all texts, including literary texts,
also cover a range from cases where audiences are unlikely to notice the inferences
they are making to those where it would be hard or impossible not to be aware to some
extent of inferences being made.
It is generally accepted that understanding acts of intentional communication,
including acts of verbal communication, involves inference. Often, inferences are made
without much, arguably without any, conscious reflection. If I invite you to lunch and
you reply:
(1) That would be lovely!
I might register your acceptance of the invitation and the fact that you are pleased to be
invited without thinking about the fact that these are conclusions I have inferred and
which you have communicated indirectly. I might or might not think about other
conclusions which follow indirectly from your utterance, including a number of
conclusions relevant to the nature of our relationship, e.g. that you feel relatively
positively towards me (since you accepted the invitation and you think that lunch with
me would be lovely), that this invite itself might help our friendship to develop, and so
on. Even if I do notice that these conclusions are communicated indirectly, I am
unlikely to notice other inferential processes which contribute to the overall
interpretation, such as that I inferred that your use of the word that was intended to
5refer to the lunch which you have been invited to. This is not a simple or obvious
inference since other things could have been the intended referent, e.g. the act of
inviting you. The use of the form would helps the hearer to identify the referent as the
lunch itself whereas the use of is in an utterance such as (2) suggests that the act of
inviting is the referent:
(2) That is so nice of you!
Most people are not aware of the distinction between linguistic semantics
(linguistically encoded meaning) and pragmatics (contextually inferred meaning) and
so never or rarely think about the fact that a large amount of what they understand
from utterances is inferred rather than explicitly communicated. But some of our
behaviour reveals that we have some awareness of communication being de3pendent
on inference. Many jokes depend on the fact that there is more than one way to
understand particular utterances. Here is one version of an often-repeated joke:
(3) A man is driving a truck down the motorway when he sees some wild
monkeys playing by the side of the road. He gathers them into his truck and
drives on. A police officer spots him and forces him to stop. The driver
explains what has happened and asks the policeman what to do. ‘I think
you’d better take them to the zoo,’ suggests the police officer. The man
agrees. The next day, the same police officer sees the same driver in the
same truck still carrying the same group of monkeys. He stops the truck
again. ‘What are you doing with the monkeys?’ asks the police officer. ‘I
thought you were taking them to the zoo.’ ‘Yes,’ replies the driver. ‘I took
them there yesterday. They loved it. Today I’m taking them to the seaside’.
6This joke is humorous because of the mismatch between what the police officer
intended when suggesting that the driver take the monkeys to the zoo and what the
driver understood by it. We understand the joke by inferring this mismatch. If someone
who has not had much experience of jokes, such as a young child, says that they don’t
understand the joke, we are likely to explain by saying something about what the police
officer meant and what the driver must have understood. This discussion reveals that
we are aware to some extent that the characters in the joke make inferences in trying
to understand each other.
Misunderstandings can also draw attention to inferential processes. I was once
embarrassed to misunderstand a student who asked this question in class:
(4) (Lecturer has been copying onto an overhead projector what he has just
been saying to the class)
Student: Excuse me. Can you read what you’re writing?
Lecturer: I’m saying it as well!
Student: Yes. Sorry. I meant could you read it out one more time please?
The student here meant to ask the lecturer to read aloud his words one more time so
that the student could take notes. The lecturer, embarrassed by his poor handwriting
and expecting criticism for it, understood this as a rhetorical question implying that the
writing really was very bad. Understanding what has gone wrong here requires
awareness of a difference between what the lecturer inferred and what the student
thought the lecturer would infer. Being thick-skinned, I then discussed this exchange in
class to help students develop their understanding of inferential processes involved in
verbal communication and the distinction between linguistic semantics and pragmatics.
Some utterances foreground complex inferential inferences even more fully.
Examples of these are often widely discussed.  Here is a well-known example:
7(5) (Bob Dylan after Dylan after reading in a newspaper that he smokes 80
cigarettes a day)
I’m glad I’m not me.
(Dont Look Back, 1965. dir. D.A. Pennebaker. NB the official title of the film
has no apostrophe; also uttered by Cate Blanchett as the Dylanesque
character Jude Quinn in I’m Not There, 2007. dir. Todd Haynes)
Dylan’s utterance here requires his audience to assign a different referent to the
pronoun me from that of the first two occurrences of the pronoun I. To make sense of
the utterance, we need to think of the two occurrences of I as referring to the Bob
Dylan who is speaking, or perhaps to Dylan’s own understanding of himself, and to
think of me as referring to the version of himself appearing in the press and other
media. Arguably, we could even distinguish the referents of the two occurrences of I. It
is hard to see how we could explain this utterance without referring directly or indirectly
to these complex inferential processes.
Political discourse is also a good source of examples. Here is what White House
spokesperson Tony Snow said to the press following the death of former Enron
executive Ken Lay during the presidency of George W. Bush:
(6) The president has described Ken Lay as an acquaintance, and many of the
president's acquaintances have passed on during his time in office.
(Reported in many sources, including: Marsha Kranes, ‘Lay Him Low:
Enron’s Chief Crook Ducks Big House by Dropping Dead’, New York Post
Online, July 6, 2006. Available at:
8http://www.nypost.com/news/nationalnews/lay_him_low__enrons_chief_cro
ok_ducks_big_house_by_dropping_dead_nationalnews_marsha_kranes.ht
m)
A full understanding of this utterance requires access to a specific set of contextual
assumptions and the ability to work through a set of complex inferential processes. The
contextual assumptions concern Ken Lay’s relationships with George W. Bush and the
scandal surrounding the company Enron. Enron was considered a very successful
company until a journalist discovered that its business was largely based on fraud and
deception. Ken Lay was one of Enron’s senior executives and was charged with
fraudulent activity as a result (several books have been published about this; perhaps
the best known is McLean and Elkind 2003, which was the basis for the film Enron:
The Smartest Guys in the Room, dir. Alex Gibney, 2005). When Enron’s dubious
dealings became commonly known, President Bush began to distance himself from the
company and its staff. Ken Lay went from being a close friend to the President (the
President had referred to him as ‘Kenny Boy’) to someone the President had no
contact with. Here is one brief summary:
(7) He started as "Kenny Boy." Then he was a "supporter," an acquaintance
who had not talked to President Bush in "quite some time." Now he is a
man convicted of conspiracy and fraud, and a symbol of corporate
corruption.
This is former Enron chief Kenneth L. Lay's transformation in the words of
President Bush and his spokesmen -- going from a personal and political
ally to someone the White House sought to keep as distant as possible as
his role in the multibillion-dollar collapse of the energy giant became clear.
9(Zachary A. Goldfarb, ‘Once A Friend and Ally, Now A Distant Memory’,
Washington Post, May 26, 2006. Available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/25/AR20060
52501958.html)
Taking this together with assumptions about the kinds of statements politicians tend to
make when a well-known person dies, the utterance in (6) is quite striking. The
President himself made no public comment and the comment made by his
spokesperson says little more than that the President knew him and that several
people the President knew had died while he was in office. The overall effect is to
communicate the sense that the President cares very little for Lay, even in death, and
does not have any worries about insulting him publicly. Naturally, this utterance was
much discussed. Again, it can be a useful starting point for discussion in class. It has
several things in common with Grice’s famous (1975) example of the letter sent by an
academic when asked to recommend a former student for a philosophy lectureship:
(8) Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is excellent, and his attendance at
tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.
(Grice 1975: 52)
In both cases, the absence of things which the hearer/reader would expect (about the
student’s understanding of philosophy, potential as a teacher etc.; about Ken Lay’s
special status, abilities, importance to the President, etc.) point to the stronger
inference that the individual lacks the relevant positive attributes. It is hard to see how
we could understand what is indirectly communicated in either case without being
aware that it is indirect and thinking to some extent about how it is indirectly
communicated.
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To sum up, we make inferences in understanding all cases of everyday
communication. In general, the fact that we are doing so is not something we think
about or discuss. The inferential processes become more salient in some cases, such
as jokes or cases where we misunderstand each other. Some cases require relatively
complex inferences where the salience of the inferential processes is relatively high.
The discussion in section 5 below considers salient inferential processes in reading
The Inheritors. The next section considers some ways of describing and explaining
inferential processes.
2 Describing and explaining inferences
Linguists, of course, are explicitly aware of the distinction between linguistically
encoded and pragmatically inferred meanings. Since the work of Paul Grice (1975;
1989), pragmatists have developed increasingly sophisticated accounts of inferred
meanings. There is, of course, disagreement about the exact nature of the semantics-
pragmatics distinction and about the extent to which meanings are encoded or inferred.
(For discussion of these issues, see Burton-Roberts 2007, Carston 2002, Levinson
2000, Recanati 2004). Nevertheless, there is widespread recognition of the role of
inference in utterance interpretation and many pragmatists accept the ‘radical
underdeterminacy thesis’ which states that the linguistically encoded meanings of
utterances vastly underdetermine their actual interpretation. A simple everyday
utterance such as (9):
(9) She’s here now
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has many different possible interpretations. These depend on accessing the
appropriate set of contextual assumptions and using them to answer a number of
questions including:
(10) a. What are the referents of she, here and now?
b. Is the speaker being literal or not?
c. Is the speaker expressing her own thought or someone else’s?
d. Is that thought a belief, a desire, a representation of someone else’s
thought or something else?
e. Is the speaker being ironic?
f. What range of implicatures is the speaker intending to communicate?
The aim of this paper is not to explore the pros and cons of any particular approach but
to consider what kinds of insights might follow from developing accounts of inference
within any framework. For consistency, the discussion will be based on a version of
Relevance Theory, starting with a simplified sketch of the kinds of things which might
be involved in understanding an utterance of (9) in an actual context.
One part of the explanation would be to sketch the ‘radically underdetermined’
linguistic meaning of (9). This semantic representation might look something like this:
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
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________ _________ is _______ _______
some
individual to
be
contextually
inferred
is representing
the thought that some individual
referent of she
to be
contextually
inferred
in some place
which is the
referent of here
and to be
contextually
inferred
at some time which
is the referent of
now and to be
contextually
inferred
Figure 1. Semantic representation of ‘she’s here now’
While this roughly corresponds to what is linguistically encoded by she’s here now, this
is not to claim that any individual ever entertains a representation like this one. Any
hearer of an utterance of she’s here now will begin computing values for the gaps in
the representation as soon as (arguably sometimes even before) the speaker begins
producing their utterance. Discussions of levels of representation, or ‘stages’ in
utterance interpretation, are always idealisations which necessarily depart from the
realities of what goes on in actual utterance interpretation. Some of the gaps in this
representation correspond to linguistic expressions which indicate that an inference
needs to be made to determine their value. These are the gaps corresponding to the
referring expressions she, here and now. For other gaps, there is no linguistic material
to indicate that an inference needs to be made. These include inferences about who is
representing the thought being communicated and how they are representing it (e.g.
we need to decide whether the speaker is expressing her own belief or attributing a
thought or utterance to someone else, we need to decide whether the speaker is
stating or asking, and so on.
The next step is to explain how the hearer accesses the intended set of
contextual assumptions and uses them to ‘fill in the blanks’ in this representation.
Suppose, for example, that an academic called Sonia has just told her colleague Tania
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that she’s been trying to contact her head of department for days but has not been able
to contact her. Tania replies with the utterance represented in (9):
(9) She’s here now.
Simplifying greatly, which includes making the false assumption that these linguistic
expressions unproblematically represent propositional representations, the range of
contextual assumptions which Sonia might use in interpreting Tania’s utterance
includes:
(11) a. It is 10am on Monday the 5th of May 2008.
b. Tania is responding to Sonia’s previous utterance in which Sonia
expressed her frustration at not being able to contact Sonia’s head of
department.
c. Tania, Sonia and Sonia’s head of department have offices in the
same building.
d. Sonia’s head of department does not mind colleagues dropping in
when she’s in her office.
Assuming Sonia can access these assumptions, and still simplifying, she should be
able to infer the following conclusions, for some of which she will have greater
evidence than others:
(12) a. Tania is communicating her (Tania’s) belief that Sonia and Tania’s
head of department is in her office at 10am on Monday the 5th of May
2008.
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b. Sonia and Tania’s head of department is in her office at 10am on
Monday the 5th of May 2008.
c. Sonia can talk to her head of department if she goes to her office now
and knocks on the door.
d. Sonia can solve the problem of not having been able to talk to her
head of department.
e. Tania has helped Sonia to solve her problem.
f. Tania is helpful.
g. Sonia should have checked to see whether her head of department
was in when she arrived on campus.
h. Tania is better than Sonia at keeping herself informed of things on
campus, including the head of department’s whereabouts.
These are organised roughly in order of how strong the evidence is for each
assumption. For example, it is quite likely that any listener would assume that Tania
has communicated (12a) but (12h) depends on a range of other assumptions about
Sonia, Tania and their relationship. It is possible that such an assumption would not
occur to either of them.
How does Sonia access these contextual assumptions and come to these
conclusions? On the Relevance Theory account, the hearer is guided by the
presumption that the speaker’s utterance is ‘optimally relevant’, i.e. that it provides
enough effects to justify the effort involved in interpreting it at the expense of other
possible cognitive activity, that it provides as many effects as are consistent with the
communicator’s abilities and preferences, and that it puts the hearer to no unjustifiable
effort in providing these effects. When Sonia considers the possibilities that she refers
to her head of department, that here refers to the building where Sonia and the head of
department have their offices, that now refers to the time of utterance, and so on, she
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arrives at an interpretation which has enough effects to justify her effort and one that
Tania manifestly could have intended. She will then conclude that this is the intended
interpretation. The different levels of strength with which she entertains the various
conclusions in (12) arise because there are differing amounts of evidence for each one.
(12a), for example, is very strongly communicated because it is hard to see how
Tania’s utterance would have been relevant without concluding this. (12b)-(12e) are
also very likely to be inferred by any hearer. The evidence for (12f) is clear but the
evidence that Tania manifestly intended to communicate it is less strong. The evidence
for (12g) and (12h) depends on specific assumptions about Tania and her relationship
with Sonia.
The discussion so far has focused on what the inferences are rather than how a
hearer will make them. We might explore this following Wilson and Sperber’s (2004:
616) outline (which they describe as ‘considerably oversimplified’) of some of the
stages in forming hypotheses about the interpretation of an utterance of ‘He forgot to
go to the bank’ as uttered by Mary in the following scenario:
(13) Peter: Did John pay back the money he owed you?
Mary: No, He forgot to go to the bank.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
16
 (a) Mary has said to Peter, “Hex forgot to go to
the BANK1 / BANK2.”
 [Hex = uninterpreted pronoun]
 [BANK1 = financial institution]
 [BANK2 = river bank]
 
 Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical
form of Mary’s utterance into a description of
Mary’s ostensive behaviour.
 (b) Mary’s utterance will be optimally relevant to
Peter.
 
 Expectation raised by recognition of Mary's
ostensive behaviour and acceptance of the
presumption of relevance it conveys.
 
 (c) Mary's utterance will achieve relevance by
explaining why John has not repaid the money
he owed her.
 
 Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact
that such an explanation would be most
relevant to Peter at this point.
 (d) Forgetting to go to the BANK1 may make
one unable to repay the money one owes.
 
 First assumption to occur to Peter which,
together with other appropriate premises, might
satisfy expectation (c). Accepted as an implicit
premise of Mary's utterance.
 
 (e) John forgot to go to the BANK1.
 
 First enrichment of the logical form of Mary's
utterance to occur to Peter which might
combine with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of
(c). Accepted as an explicature of Mary’s
utterance.
 
(f) John was unable to repay Mary the money
he owes because he forgot to go to the BANK1.
 Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and
accepted as an implicit conclusion of Mary’s
utterance.
 
 (g) John may repay Mary the money he owes
when he next goes to the BANK1.
 From (f) plus background knowledge. One of
several possible weak implicatures of Mary’s
utterance which, together with (f), satisfy
expectation (b).
 
Figure 2. Schematic outline of hypotheses formed in interpreting an utterance of ‘He
forgot to go to the bank’
(Wilson and Sperber 2004: 616)
Even in this ‘oversimplified’ form, it is clear that explaining inferences fully takes
considerable time and space. Using a similar diagram, we can represent some of the
stages in inferring hypotheses about Tania’s utterance in (9). Here is a representation
of just the first few stages:
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
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 (a) Tania has said to Sonia “Shex is herex nowx”
 [Shex = uninterpreted pronoun]
 [Herex = uninterpreted pronoun]
 [Nowx = uninterpreted pronoun]
 
 Embedding of the decoded (incomplete) logical
form of Tania’s utterance into a description of
Tania’s ostensive behaviour.
 (b) Tania’s utterance will be optimally relevant
to Sonia.
 
 Expectation raised by recognition of Tania's
ostensive behaviour and acceptance of the
presumption of relevance it conveys.
 
 (c) Tania’s utterance will achieve relevance by
responding to Sonia’s expression of frustration
at not being able to see her head of
department.
 
 Expectation raised by (b), together with the fact
that a response to Sonia’s previous utterance
would be most relevant to Sonia at this point.
 (d) If Sonia’s head of department were in her
office at the current time (10am on the 5th of
May 2008) then Sonia could speak to the had of
department
 
 First assumption to occur to Sonia which,
together with other appropriate premises, might
satisfy expectation (c).
 
 (e) Sonia’s head of department is in her office
at 10am on the 5th of May 2008.
 
 First enrichment of the logical form of Tania’s
utterance to occur to Sonia which might
combine with (d) to lead to the satisfaction of
(c). Accepted as an explicature of Mary’s
utterance.
 
(f) Sonia will be able to talk to her head of
department if she goes to her office and knocks
on the door at or shortly after 10am on the 5th of
May 2008
 Inferred from (d) and (e), satisfying (c) and
accepted as an implicit conclusion of Tania’
utterance.
 
 (g) John may repay Mary the money he owes
when he next goes to the BANK1.
 From (f) plus background knowledge. One of
several possible weak implicatures of Mary’s
utterance which, together with (f), satisfy
expectation (b).
 
Figure 3. Schematic outline of hypotheses formed in interpreting an utterance of ‘She’s
here now’
(based on Wilson and Sperber 2004: 616)
This brief, superficial sketch of what is involved in interpreting the utterances
should be enough to indicate one of the major obstacles to providing relatively full and
relatively explicit accounts of inferential processes in developing stylistic analyses.
Even this partial account requires a significant amount of time and space to develop
and express. The requirements for fuller accounts of larger texts will of course be much
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higher. Section 5 below provides some evidence that the effort will sometimes be
worthwhile.
3 Stylistics and inference
Given that all interpretations depend on inference, we might expect stylistic analysis
routinely to involve accounts of inferential processes. The importance of inferential
processes in understanding texts has often been acknowledged by work in stylistics
and there has been an increase in the amount of work which at least mentions
inferential processes or pragmatics more broadly. (For a general overview, see
MacMahon 2006. Work which recognises a role for pragmatics in stylistic analysis, and
in some cases focuses closely on pragmatic analysis, includes: Bex, Burke and
Stockwell 2000; Black 2006; Culpeper 2001; Culpeper, Short and Verdonk 1998;
Leech and Short 1981; van Peer and Renkema 1984; Pilkington 2000; Pratt 1977; Sell
1991; Simpson 1993, 2003a, 2003b; Toolan 1992, 1996, 1998. Naturally, it is not
possible to offer anything approaching a comprehensive list). The aim of this paper is
not to survey the range of work which focuses on inferential processes, but rather to
consider what kinds of contribution might be made by an account of inferential
processes. There are a number of possible stances which might be taken by a
stylistician who recognises the role of inferential processes in understanding and
responding to texts. For the purposes of the present discussion, this paper considers
four options. Of course, these are not the only possible positions to take, and they are
sketched only briefly here, but they indicate possible responses to the tension between
recognising the role of inference and recognising the practical difficulties in developing
inferential analyses. The first two positions, the ‘hardline inferentialist’ position and the
‘casual inferentialist’ position, represent extremes and this paper will not argue for
either of them. Options three and four, the ‘occasional inferentialist’ and the
19
‘sophisticated inferentialist’, seem more promising at first glance and the suggestion
here will be that ‘sophisticated inferentialism’ is the most reasonable approach at the
moment.
a) ‘hardline inferentialism’
On this view, it is essential to explore all of the inferential processes involved in
understanding every text since all acts of interpretation involve inference. Three things
make this seem impractical. First, the time and space taken to develop an adequate
analysis of even a short utterance such as ‘she’s here now’ (and remember that the
discussion above did not go into detail on each inferential step) mean that it will be
almost impossible ever to provide an actual analysis of every inferential process
involved in any one text. Second, variation from individual to individual means that we
can hope at best either for an account of just one individual’s interpretation or some
kind of summary which attempts to roughly merge the different interpretations of a
group of interpreters. Finally, even for one individual there will be no clear single
interpretation. In interpreting Tania’s utterance of ’she’s here now’ as indicated above,
Sonia may well be uncertain whether there is any implicature of reproach or of Tania’s
superiority to Sonia. She may even change her mind from one moment to the next or
reinterpret the utterance several times. Or, as in ‘non-spontaneous’ interpretation
(Furlong 1996), the kind of sustained explicit inferential processing involved in
developing literary interpretations, she might spend a very long time thinking about the
interpretation of the text. Lovers of literature or literary scholars might claim to well
spend a whole lifetime interpreting one text. Given this, issues of idealisation and
representativeness are very important here.
b) ‘casual inferentialism’
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On this view, it is not important to explore inferential processes since we can all see
what inferences we make without having to develop an explicit account for each one.
One argument against this view is that it rules out in principle the exploration of one of
the key processes involved in interpreting texts. If inference is what audiences do, and
a large part of what a writer does is to attempt to manipulate the inferences of readers,
it seems to be a non-starter to decide in advance that we will not be interested. It is
also clear from work in linguistic pragmatics that the processes we go through in
inferring meanings are far from obvious. There is still considerable debate, for
example, around how we understand utterances containing ‘simple’ everyday words
such as and, but, some, all or cardinal numbers (see Blakemore 2002 and Carston
2002 for discussion of some of these issues). It is not immediately obvious to all adults,
for example, that the word some has a linguistic meaning which is consistent with the
use of all. For example, Noveck (2001; see also Bott and Noveck 2004) has shown that
adults often think an utterance such as (14) is false given that all elephants are
mammals:
(14) Some elephants are mammals.
Noveck’s work suggests that children under the age of 10 are ‘more logical’ than adults
since they are more likely to accept that (14) is true if they know that all elephants are
mammals. Finally, a huge amount of work in literary studies can be understood as
being concerned with inferences we make when reading and responding to texts. It
surely makes sense to apply whatever techniques we have to investigating how these
processes work.
c) ‘occasional inferentialism’
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This is the view that an account of inferential processes is important in cases where
there is something unusual or marked about the inferential processes we go through
when understanding a text, but that it is otherwise not something stylisticians should
think about. Thinking of our ‘everyday’ examples above, this view would reject an
exploration of the inferential processes involved in understanding ‘that would be lovely’
in response to a dinner invitation or ‘she’s here now’ in response to en expression of
frustration at not seeing someone, but it would presumably think it is worth exploring
how we understand or don’t understand jokes, cases of misunderstanding and highly
marked cases such as the utterances by Bob Dylan and Tony Snow.
‘Occasional inferentialism’ seems to be a more defensible position than the two
extremes we have looked at so far. The risk it runs is that important insights might be
missed since cases which seem straightforward may well turn out to be more
complicated when examined more closely.
d) ‘sophisticated inferentialism’
On this view, which might also be termed ‘practical inferentialism’, it is in principle
always worth exploring all of the inferential processes involved in understanding a text,
but not practical to do so. Where analysts notice something marked or unusual about
an interpretation, this calls for an analysis of inferential processes. But cases which
seem simpler are in principle of interest too. It will be up to the analyst to decide in
each case whether and where to develop an account of inferential processes. This
approach will be briefly applied in section 5. Before that, section 4 will look at two
generally successful works of stylistic analysis which offer genuine insights without
developing a detailed account of inference.
4 The Inheritors — previous analyses
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Many readers find The Inheritors deeply disturbing. But it is also generally considered
to be gripping and thought-provoking. Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor (1964: 11) suggest
that ‘the sharpest reaction to a first reading ... is often one of puzzlement’ and that after
a first reading ‘we feel in the presence of a difficult if fascinating book’. Much of the
difficulty and the fascination arise because of linguistic decisions made by Golding in
writing it. Section 5 explores some of the ways in which Golding’s text can be
understood as an exercise in manipulating the inferential processes of readers. This
section briefly summarises the book and then outlines two very successful analyses.
The first is Halliday’s (1971) famous analysis which applies ideas from Halliday’s own
work on grammar and explores different linguistic styles associated with different
passages of the book. The second is Hoover’s (1999) thorough and illuminating
analysis based on corpus data. Hoover’s work supports some of Halliday’s conclusions
but rejects and replaces others. While neither of these accounts say much about
inference, they both seem likely to be complemented by an account of inferential
processes. Hoover explicitly suggests that a fuller account of inferential processes is
likely to be useful in helping us understand the text. After looking at these two analyses
and developing a sense of what can be achieved without (much) analysis of inference,
section 5 considers what might be added by an explicit account of inferential
processes. A central claim of this paper is that significant effects of the novel can be
explained in terms of the inferential processes of readers.
4.1 The Inheritors: structure and interpretation
Many existing discussions summarise The Inheritors. Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor
(2002) offer perhaps the best-known general literary discussion (an earlier edition of
this book was referred to by Halliday in his 1971 paper). The style of the novel has also
been discussed by a number of authors, including Adriaens 1970, Black 1993, Halliday
1971, Hoover 1999, Lee 1976. This section offers a very brief summary of the novel’s
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structure and mentions a few key aspects of its interpretation which most readers are
likely to share.
The book begins with an epigraph:
(15) “ . . . We know very little of the appearance of the Neanderthal man, but this
. . . seems to suggest an extreme hairiness, an ugliness, or a repulsive
strangeness in his appearance over and above his low forehead, his beetle
brows, his ape neck, and his inferior stature. . . . Says Sir Harry Johnston,
in a survey of the rise of modern man in his Views and Reviews: ‘The dim
racial remembrance of such gorilla-like monsters, with cunning brains,
shambling gait, hairy bodies, strong teeth, and possibly cannibalistic
tendencies, may be the germ of the ogre in folklore. . . .’ ”
H.G. Wells, Outline of History
Following this, the book itself can be seen as divided into three sections (Hoover
disagrees with Halliday about the division into sections; this summary follows Hoover’s
assumptions). The first and by far the largest part of the book (pages 1-216; page
references here are to the 1955 hardback edition) is presented by a third-person
narrator who often seems to share some of the point of view, or ‘mind style’ (Fowler
1977: 103-113; Fowler 1986: 150-167; see also discussion by Leech and Short 1981:
187-208 and Semino 2007) of the main character Lok and his people (usually referred
to as ‘the people’):
(16) Lok was running as fast as he could. His head was down and he carried his
thorn bush horizontally for balance and smacked the drifts of vivid buds
aside with his free hand. Liku rode him laughing, one hand clutched in the
chestnut curls that lay on his neck and down his spine, the other holding
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the little Oa tucked under his chin. Lok’s feet were clever. They saw. They
threw him round the displayed roots of the beeches, leapt when a puddle of
water lay across the trail. Liku beat his belly with her feet.
“Faster!  Faster!”
His feet stabbed, he swerved and slowed. Now they could hear the
river that lay parallel but hidden to their left. The beeches opened, the bush
went away and they were in the little patch of flat mud where the log was.
“There, Liku.”
The onyx marsh water was spread before them, widening into the
river. The trail along by the river began again on the other side on ground
that rose until it was lost in the trees. Lok, grinning happily, took two paces
towards the river and stopped. The grin faded and his mouth opened till the
lower lip hung down. Liku slid to his knee then dropped to the ground. She
put the little Oa’s head to her mouth and looked over her.
Lok laughed uncertainly.
“The log has gone away.”
(Golding 1955: 11-12)
The second section, from pages 216 to 222, is presented by a more detached third-
person narrator:
(17) The red creature stood on the edge of the terrace and did nothing. The
hollow log was a dark spot on the water towards the place where the sun
had gone down. The air in the gap was clear and blue and calm. There was
no noise at all now except for the fall, for there was no wind and the green
sky was clear. The red creature turned to the right and trotted slowly
towards the far end of the terrace. Water was cascading down the rocks
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beyond the terrace from the melting ice in the mountains. The river was
high and flat and drowned the edge of the terrace. There were long scars in
the earth and rock where the branches of a tree had been dragged past by
the water. The red creature came trotting back to a dark hollow in the side
of the cliff where there was evidence of occupation.
(Golding 1955: 216-217)
The third and final section, from pages 223 to 233, makes up the twelfth and final
chapter and is presented by a third-person narrator who seems to share some of the
point of view of the character Tuami and the ‘new people’:
(18) Tuami sat in the stern of the dug-out, the steering paddle under his left arm.
There was plenty of light and the patches of salt no longer looked like holes
in the skin sail. He thought bitterly of the great square sail they had left
bundled up in that last mad hour among the mountains; for with that and
the breeze through the gap he need not have endured these hours of
strain. He need not have sat all night wondering whether the current would
beat the wind and bear them back to the fall while the people or as many as
were left of them slept their collapsed sleep. Still, they had moved on, the
walls of rock folding back until this lake became so broad that he had been
able to find no transits for judging their motion but sat, guessing, with the
mountains looming over the flat water and his eyes red with the tears of
strain. Now he stirred a little for the rounded bilge was hard and the pad of
leather that many steersmen had moulded to a comfortable seat was lost
on the slope up from the forest. He could feel the slight pressure
transmitted to his forearm along the loom of the paddle and knew that if he
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were to trail his hand over the side the water would tinkle against the palm
and heap up over his wrist.
(Golding 1955: 223)
Of course, it is not possible here to explore all of the many interpretations of the
book which have been or could be suggested. In part, the book is a response to Harry
Johnston’s idea quoted by Wells which Golding used as an epigraph to the novel.
Contradicting the view of Neanderthal man as brutish and ogre-like, the book suggests
that the Neanderthals are gentle and sensitive. The contrast between the
Neanderthals, referred to as the ‘people’, and the new people is an important part of
the book. Where the people are empathetic (even telepathic), social beings, the new
people are individualistic and selfish. The people have no secrets from each other and
have a strong awareness that what affects one of them affects all of them. The new
people are each out for themselves and willing to commit savage acts to further their
own individual ends. The realisation that the new people are closer ancestors to
contemporary humans than the people is one of the key ideas in the book. We
understand that the new people are ‘the inheritors’ and that their arrival has caused the
extinction of the people. Interpretations will then consider what the book suggests
about ‘us’, i.e. homo sapiens, how exactly it challenges the view expressed in the
epigraph, how the ‘innocence’ of the people contributes to their downfall, how the
‘knowingness’ of the new people helps them, the positive and negative aspects of both
the ‘innocence’ and the ‘knowingness’, and so on. Readers will also think about
connections with Biblical ideas such as ‘the Fall’ and Eden (various kinds of fall are
mentioned in the book and there is a key moment where terrible knowledge is gained
by a character in a tree). There is room for considerable discussion of possible different
interpretations of the book, and there is no space here to do justice to them. The main
interpretive argument developed below is that a key aspect of the contrast between the
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two groups and our understanding of the story is based on the different kinds of
inferential processes we go through when reading different parts of the book.
4.2 Halliday on The Inheritors
Halliday’s (1971) analysis of The Inheritors, described recently as ‘one of the
groundbreaking analyses in stylistics’ (Carter and Stockwell 2008: 19), sees the book
as divided into two parts with a transitional section between them. Part one is in
‘Language A’ and part two is in ‘Language C’. Halliday argues that there is no
‘Language B’ but that the transitional passage has features of both languages.
He lists a number of features of Language A. These include restricted diction
(e.g. the use of words such as stick, twig or log rather than bow, arrow or boat
reflecting the fact that the people do not know about such things as bows, arrows or
boats), inanimate objects or human body parts appearing as the subjects of transitive
verbs (e.g. his feet stabbed in the extract in (16) above), and a high number of
intransitive verbs. Language C, by contrast, has richer diction (e.g. objects are referred
to as dug-out, steering paddle, sail, and so on), human subjects for transitive verbs and
a higher incidence of transitive verbs. Halliday suggests (1971: 349-353) that in the first
part of the book:
‘The picture is one in which people act, but they do not act on
things; they move, but they move only themselves, not other
objects ... It is particularly the lack of transitive clauses of
action with human subjects . . . that creates an atmosphere of
ineffectual activity: the scene is one of constant movement,
but movement which is as much inanimate as human and in
which only the mover is affected — nothing else changes ... it
is the syntax as such, rather than the syntactic reflection of the
subject-matter, to which we are responding ... the entire
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transitivity structure of Language A can be summed up by
saying that there is no cause and effect.’
(Halliday 1971: 349-353)
Halliday’s claim is that facts about the syntax of the text contribute to particular
kinds of interpretations. In particular, the syntax is one of the ways in which we
understand that the people lack agency, move themselves but not the world around
them, fail to understand or realise relationships of cause and effect. Halliday goes so
far as to suggest that ‘it is the syntax as such, rather than the syntactic reflection of the
subject matter, to which we are responding’ (Halliday 1971: 350).
Halliday’s work was much discussed, the most well-known discussion surely
being the attack by Fish (1973), who took Halliday’s paper as an example representing
problems with stylistics as a whole. The strongest claim Fish made was that Halliday’s
analysis, like most work in stylistics at that time, was arbitrary in that there was no
reason to link the description of linguistic features to one interpretation rather than
another. Questions about interpretations of the book are discussed in more detail in
section 5 below.
4.3 Hoover on The Inheritors
Hoover defends Halliday against Fish’s criticisms. As well as referring to earlier
discussion of Fish’s approach in general by Milic (1985) and Ellis (1989: 113-136)
which demonstrates that ‘the attack frequently seems unfair and misguided’, he points
out greater similarities between Halliday and Fish than Fish realises:
‘The kinds of analyses that Fish and Halliday favor do not
seem so different as Fish wants to claim: he prefers to
emphasize readers’ temporal activities when faced with a text,
and Halliday prefers to concentrate more on the
characteristics of the text that elicit and partly constrain those
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activities. Neither element can be ignored. Surely no one
believes that readers’ activities are unconstrained by the texts
to which they respond, just as no one believes that texts
completely determine the interpretive activities of readers. The
difficult and interesting question is to what extent and in what
ways readers, with their internalized and partly institutional
assumptions, beliefs, and interpretive techniques, create
meanings from marks on paper; and to what extent and in
what ways those ink marks, with their partly conventional and
institutional status as passages of a language (and their status
as literary texts), constrain, regulate, or influence the activities
of readers. With this question on the table, we can proceed to
a re-examination of the specific claims of Halliday’s analysis.’
(Hoover 1999: 26)
While Hoover thinks Halliday’s approach is a good one and that it generates useful
insights into how the text creates its effects, he also points out two problems with
Halliday’s analysis. First, it is not explicit enough. Hoover explains in some detail his
own attempt to replicate Halliday’s analysis (pp.27-41) and a number of uncertainties
he faced in doing so. More importantly, though, he suggests that the main part of
Halliday’s analysis is wrong:
‘A more serious problem with Halliday’s analysis exists than
those caused by lack of explicitness and what seem to be
misclassifications, or at least questionable classifications: its
central claim is simply wrong. The Inheritors cannot be divided
into two different sections or languages on the basis of
differences in transitivity patterns. It is simply not true that the
first long section (language A) is very intransitive compared
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with the second short section (language C). While the lack of
transitive verbs with human subjects in passages like A does
show certain limitations in Lok’s understanding, it is not true
that the Neanderthal world as a whole lacks cause and effect,
nor that the people cannot act as agents in their world, as
Halliday claims.’
(Hoover 1999: 41)
While Hoover agrees that patterns of transitivity are important, he suggests that the
nature of these patterns is not as simple as suggested by Halliday and, in particular,
that ‘There is no monolithic language A, at least not with respect to transitivity’ (Hoover
1999: 26). Based on evidence from corpus work, Hoover concludes that ‘....the
extremely high levels of transitivity in some sections of language A are more unusual
than the low levels in some sections of language A and language C’ (Hoover 1999: 46).
He rejects Halliday’s suggestion that the transitivity levels are ‘independent of subject
matter’ (Hoover 1999: 46) and points out that the language of the people is often
straightforwardly transitive, as here, for example:
(19) They followed the scent from the blood to the edge of the river. There
was blood on the rock by the water too and a little milk. Fa pressed her
hands on her head and gave her picture words.
“They killed Nil and threw her into the water. And the old woman.”
“They have taken Liku and the new one”
(Golding 1955: 114)
Hoover concludes that Halliday was right to focus on transitivity and agency,
particularly when the people are trying to understand the strange ways of the new
people. But he questions the conclusion that this is because there is no cause and
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effect in the world as understood by the people. Significantly, he suggests that ‘the
sense of powerlessness and ineffectuality that Halliday ascribes to the syntax seems to
inhere instead in the plot. Lok and the people are unsuccessful in their struggle with the
new people, who seem powerful in contrast because of their success.’ (Hoover 1999:
52). At the same time, he discusses evidence that the people are superior in some
ways to the new people, e.g. morally and spiritually. Ultimately, Hoover suggests that
the main linguistic characteristics of The Inheritors (mainly of Language A) are:
• short, simple sentences, mainly in simple past tense
• body parts and inanimate objects as agents, and as subjects of mental
process and perception verbs, and intransitive verbs of motion
• body parts and inanimate objects with attributes normally associated with
animate beings
• a small, concentrated, peculiarly distributed vocabulary of short words
• a high proportion of very frequent concrete, physical nouns and verbs
• natural object words used to refer to artifacts, buildings, and boats
• words referring to modern cultural phenomena and activities and names of
known places and people are absent
Despite their differences, and despite objections from some, Halliday’s and Hoover’s
approaches both illustrate how detailed and systematic stylistic analysis can help us to
understand how this text gives rise to particular effects for readers. Hoover’s
impressive and careful corpus work shows that stylistic analyses can be tested,
compared and improved upon, and there seems to be little doubt that Halliday’s and
Hoover’s work both help us to understand how the book creates effects for readers.
Hoover’s exploration of Halliday’s analysis and suggestions for improvement are also
evidence of a systematic approach making claims which can be tested and improved in
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the light of further studies. The next section considers what might be added by a
systematic account of inferential processes.
5 The Inheritors and inference
Both Halliday’s and Hoover’s analyses are likely to encourage pragmatists to think that
they have something to contribute to our understanding of The Inheritors.
Halliday (1971: 330) makes clear that he is looking for ways of judging which linguistic
features are relevant to the meaning of the text:
‘My main concern, in this paper, is with criteria of relevance.
This, it seems to me, is one of the central problems in the
study of ‘style in language’: I mean the problem of
distinguishing between mere linguistic regularity, which in itself
is of no interest to literary studies, and regularity which is
significant for the poem or prose work in which we find it.’
(Halliday 1971: 330)
This will encourage any pragmatist to think they might have some answers and not
only because the term ‘relevance’ chimes with uses of that term in a number of
pragmatic theories. A natural assumption is that what makes a linguistic regularity
‘significant’ is the fact that it plays a role in interpretations or other effects of the text on
its audience. Halliday’s claim for the relevance of the features he discusses is that ‘by
considering how the meaning [of features he discusses] ‘relates to an interpretation of
the meaning of the work, one can show that they are relevant both as subject-matter
and as underlying theme’ (Halliday 1971: 358). Pragmatic theories aim explicitly to
account for the effects on audiences of the use of particular linguistic forms. A large
part of an account of what makes a particular linguistic choice significant, and in some
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cases consciously noticed by audiences, will be an account of the pragmatic processes
of interpretation.
Hoover explicitly mentions the role pragmatics might play:
‘While I have made modest use of what might be called
reader-response analysis in chapter 1, and have referred to
pragmatic analysis in chapter 1, the latter, especially,
deserves a fuller treatment.’
(Hoover 1999: xvii)
He goes on to make brief suggestions about how pragmatic accounts might be
developed for two specific passages in the novel. This section responds to Hoover’s
suggestion by considering some ways in which an account of the inferential processes
of readers might help us to understand the text. Section 5.1 suggests how we might
account for specific local inferences made when reading the text by fleshing out
accounts of two passages discussed by Hoover. Section 5.2 considers how we might
flesh out comments made by Hoover, which did not refer explicitly to pragmatics, on
the effects of specific kinds of contextual material, including the design of the cover and
its epigraph. Section 5.3 considers ‘global’ inferences about the interpretation of the
book as a whole and the development of literary interpretations. Section 5.4 contrasts
local inferences made when reading different parts of the book and suggests that some
of the impact of the book derives from salient differences in the kinds of inferences
made when reading different sections.
5.1 Local inferences
Hoover makes some suggestions about ways in which pragmatics might help with the
interpretation of two particular passages. This section fleshes out the discussion of
these by considering what a pragmatic theory might say about them.
Hoover discusses this passage near the beginning of the book:
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(20) Fa looked across to the place where the broken trail began again. There
was earth churned up there where the other end of the log had lain. She
asked a question of Ha and he answered her with his mouth.
(Golding 1955: 13)
Making clear that the communicative relationship being focused on is between author
and reader rather than between characters in the novel, Hoover (1999: 4) suggests
that the final sentence here can be understood as an apparent violation of the Gricean
maxim of quantity (Grice 1975). Since we presuppose that asking and answering
questions in face-to-face interaction will be by way of mouths and ears, it seems odd to
say that Ha answered ‘with his mouth’. ‘Unless we have other reasons to believe that
the narrator is unreliable, however, we are more likely to revise our ideas about the
fictional world than to doubt the author’s sincerity or competence’ (Hoover 1999: 4). So
we look for an explanation and decide that face-to-face communication for the people
does not necessarily or automatically involve mouths and ears. As Hoover points out,
this will reinforce conclusions suggested by other passages, e.g. where Lok’s feet are
described as if they had sight (‘Lok’s feet were clever. They saw’) and suggestions that
the people might be able to communicate nonverbally or even telepathically.
This inferential process follows a fairly common pattern. Toolan (1998: 174)
makes a similar suggestion in explaining part of our understanding of Raymond
Carver’s story Cathedral (Carver 1983). In discussing a blind man, Robert, who is a
friend of his wife and whose own wife, Beulah, has recently died, the character
narrating the story tells us something about the blind man and his wife’s life together:
(21) They’d married, lived and worked together, slept together — had sex, sure
— and then the blind man had to bury her.
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(Carver 1983: 213)
Toolan suggests that:
‘...what jars is what the husband assumes to be in need of
telling, on the presupposition that if he had not done so, we
addressees might have assumed otherwise. Thus he judges
that he needs to tell us that Beulah and Robert ‘slept together
— had sex, sure —‘, believing that we wouldn’t have expected
such normal human behaviour from a couple that included a
blind person.’
(Toolan 1998: 174)
More generally, we often seem to make inferences based on wondering why a speaker
or writer chose a particular kind of wording. Within Grice’s approach, both of these
cases would be explained along the lines suggested by Hoover, as apparent violations
of the maxim of quantity which therefore lead to implicatures which preserve the
assumption that the utterance as a whole is appropriately informative. Within
Relevance Theory, the assumption is that a speaker or writer will only put us to the
effort of processing something if there is a justification for it in terms of cognitive
effects. Many cases have been discussed where a small amount of extra effort results
in increased effects.
(22) a. How are you?
b. How are you these days?
(23) a. My childhood days are gone.
b. My childhood days are gone, gone.
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Zegarac and Clark (1999: 336) discuss the examples in (22) within the framework of
Relevance Theory. (22b) differs from (22a) only in the addition of the two words these
days. Strictly, these words add to what is communicated only something which would
usually have been inferred even if these words had not been uttered, i.e. that the
period of time during which the hearer’s well-being is of interest is around the time of
the utterance. But the speaker has chosen to put the hearer to the extra effort involved
in processing these words and Relevance Theory claims that hearers will assume that
any effort they are asked to expend is justifiable. This means that this utterance must
be communicating something more than would have been conveyed by (22a). A likely
explanation is that the speaker wants to know about how the hearer is ‘these days’ in
contrast to how they were at some earlier time. This will in turn suggest that the
speaker has a genuine interest in the hearer’s current situation and so (22b) is likely to
be understood as ‘less phatic’ than (22a) would have been in a similar context.
Sperber and Wilson (1986: 219) discuss (23b) alongside other examples of
repetition and suggest that the ‘poetic’ effects of the repetition here follow because the
only accessible justification for the repetition is as an encouragement to think about the
speaker’s emotional state. So the hearer is encouraged to think about the speaker’s
emotional state while thinking about the distance of their childhood days.
Returning to the example from The Inheritors, there is in fact more to say than we
have said so far about the effect of saying that Ha answered ‘with his mouth’. If we
simply removed these words, the passage would still sound odd:
(24) Fa looked across to the place where the broken trail began again. There
was earth churned up there where the other end of the log had lain. She
asked a question of Ha and he answered her.
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The last sentence in this version is still odd. It seems that it is odd to state that she
asked a question and he answered, even without saying that he answered ‘with his
mouth’. Alongside the sense that it is telling us too much to say that he used his mouth
to answer, it is at the same time too little just to tell us that she asked something and
he answered. Using the same logic as we have used so far, this would suggest that it
is unusual for the people to ask and answer questions. This would, of course, fit with
Hoover’s initial suggestion that the passage connects with hypotheses we are already
forming about how the people can communicate without words and perhaps
telepathically. Hoover refers to this passage on page 12:
(25) She came straight to the water’s edge, looked, smelt, then turned
accusingly to Lok. She did not need to speak. Lok began to jerk his head at
her.
(Golding 1955: 12)
If the people sometimes do not need to speak and can understand each other in a
different way, then it will be relevant to let us know when one of the people needs to
ask a question of another, even if it is not asked with a mouth, as well as to tell us
when someone uses a mouth to reply. Now consider how the passage carries on in the
original version:
(26) Fa looked across to the place where the broken trail began again. There
was earth churned up there where the other end of the log had lain. She
asked a question of Ha and he answered her with his mouth.
“One day. Perhaps two days. Not three.”
(Golding 1955: 13)
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What does Ha’s response tell us? That the question is quite specific, expecting an
answer about a duration of time measured in days, and that he understood exactly
what this fairly precise question was. So this exchange tells us more about how the
people can communicate with each other. By showing us only what the people
perceive externally, it also makes clear to us that we are not able to access all of the
things that are being communicated. This ties in with other interpretations about how
there are some ways in which the people are superior to us. We are missing out on
something which they possess in their ability to communicate so effectively without
words. We are being shown this and made to experience our separateness to some
extent, rather than simply being told about it. We are frustrated in our inability to
understand the people’s world fully.
Whether explanations are couched within a Gricean approach, making reference
to the maxim of quantity, within a Relevance Theory approach based on the
presumption that any effort on the part of the hearer/reader will be justified by effects,
or within the framework of some other pragmatic theory, it seems clear that Hoover’s
account of the extract from The Inheritors, like Toolan’s account of the extract from
Cathedral, are cases where an account of the inferential processes of readers helps us
to understand the effects of a text. The brief discussion here also suggests that there is
more to be said about the detailed inferential processes involved and that exploring
these will help explain the effects of the text.
Hoover also sees the ‘restricted diction’, or ‘underlexicalisation’ (the term coined
by Fowler 1981: 40; Fowler 1986: 152-154) of the people as a feature of the text which
is likely to be explicable in terms of pragmatics:
‘Golding also avoids, at times with great difficulty, names for
artifacts which the new people use but which are not part of
the Neanderthal world. As we saw in the discussion of Ha’s
answering Fa with his mouth, a pragmatic analysis helps to
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show how these dictional restrictions work. When the
Neanderthals consistently call boats “logs”, for example, the
apparent violation of the maxim of quality counts as a
demonstration that Lok does not know what a boat is rather
than as a real violation. To put it more accurately, Golding’s
flouting of the maxim of quality reveals a gap in Lok’s
vocabulary and in Neanderthal culture.’
(Hoover 1999: 10)
Again, Hoover is careful here to make clear that he is focusing on what the author is
communicating to the reader rather than what the characters are communicating to
each other. He is surely right to suggest that an account of the inferential processes of
readers coming across these vocabulary items will help us to understand the effects of
the text. In fact, though, it is doubtful that reference to the maxim of quality will be the
best way to explain this. First, there are reasons to doubt the usefulness of a notion of
‘quality’ or ‘truthfulness’ in general (see Wilson and Sperber 2002 for discussion). More
importantly here, it is unlikely that a full account of these specific usages can be
developed in terms of a maxim of quality. In some cases, it is not clear that the choice
of vocabulary item gives rise to falsehood. It is not strictly false to say that a hollowed
out log used as a boat is still a log. Arguably, the bow in the book is still a stick and
even the arrow may be a sharpened twig. The issue here seems to be more one of
appropriateness. We expect a log used for water transportation to be referred to as a
‘boat’, and so on for the other tools. One general problem with Grice’s suggestions
about the role of the maxim of quality in explaining particular interpretations is that it is
not clear how we know which interpretation to go for when we recognise a violation of
the maxim. How do we know when a violation should point us to a metaphorical
interpretation, when it should point us to an ironical interpretation, and so on? This
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problem also arises here. We could, for example, ask why readers do not decide that
these uses are metaphorical. Black (1993) also discusses the underlexicalisation of the
people. She points out that the distinction between underlexicalisation and metaphor is
not always easy to draw and suggests that this follows because ‘metaphor is one way
of extending the lexical resources of language’ (Black 1993: 41). She suggests that:
‘Cases of underlexicalisation are clear when a non-specific
noun (such as log) is used to refer to something for which a
specific word exists in English’
(Black 1993: 41)
Underlexicalisation, she suggests, is ‘a technique which is used to suggest that the
people are at a very early stage of linguistic development’ (Black 1993: 41). She goes
further and suggests that the book shows us the people developing linguistically as
well as in other ways, making some specific suggestions about the meaning of
metaphor and simile, and how the people’s understanding of these develops through
the book.
Black’s discussion supports the idea that it is appropriateness rather than
truthfulness which is relevant here and it suggests a similarity between this case and
the extract in (20) above (‘he answered her with his mouth’). In both cases, the reader
is expected to notice something unusual in the words used and to infer a reason for
this. In (20), we infer that answering with his mouth is not necessarily what would be
expected of Ha. In the cases of underlexicalisation, we infer the absence of expected
vocabulary and, further, that this absence reflects a lack of contact with examples of
the concepts expressed by the vocabulary, i.e. we assume that Lok does not know
what a boat is, or what bows and arrows are. Black also makes the point (1993: 44)
that to treat cases which are less clearcut as metaphor rather than underlexicalisation
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would have the effect of distancing us from the point of view of Lok and the people. Of
course, one key aspect of Golding’s style is the way in which he manipulates our
understanding of the point of view, or mind style, from which the story is narrated.
Many of the inferences discussed here contribute to our sense of that mind style and
this is discussed in more detail in section 5.4. In the next section, we consider the
effects of material which readers come across before reading the main part of the
novel.
5.2 Contextual assumptions before reading
This section considers how readers might be affected by assumptions they entertain
before they begin reading. There are, of course, many different kinds of assumptions
which readers might make before reading any book. These include assumptions about
the author and her/his status in the literary world, about the book itself, perhaps based
on reviews or on what others have said about it, and assumptions created by the book
itself, e.g. by its cover or by its location in the bookshop where it was bought. Hoover
(1999: 1-4) begins his book with a discussion of the epigraph, the cover design on the
version he first read and a later edition and some of the inferences readers are likely to
make as they read the opening pages (culminating in the passage discussed in (20)
above where Ha answers ‘with his mouth’). There are several ways in which we might
flesh out Hoover’s brief discussion of how such preliminary material affects
interpretations. One possibility is that such material generates contextual assumptions
which help to narrow down interpretations. This might resemble the effect of
information about topic which provides a ‘frame’ for understanding a text, as explored
in Bransford and Johnson’s well-known (1972) paper. Here, for example, the
information that the topic is ‘the paragraph you will hear will be about washing clothes’
had a dramatic (facilitating) effect on comprehension of this passage (only the
beginning is reproduced here):
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(27) The procedure is actually quite simple. First you arrange things into
different groups depending on their makeup. Of course, one pile may be
sufficient depending on how much there is to do. If you have to go
somewhere else due to lack of facilities that is the next step, otherwise you
are pretty well set...
(Bransford and Johnson 1972: 722)
Here, the information that the passage is about ‘washing clothes’ helps readers to
assign referents to noun phrases such as ‘the procedure’, and ‘things’ and so on.
Often, however, the effect is much less determinate. Consider, for example, the
epigraph at the beginning of the book:
(28) “ . . . We know very little of the appearance of the Neanderthal man, but this
. . . seems to suggest an extreme hairiness, an ugliness, or a repulsive
strangeness in his appearance over and above his low forehead, his beetle
brows, his ape neck, and his inferior stature. . . . Says Sir Harry Johnston,
in a survey of the rise of modern man in his Views and Reviews: ‘The dim
racial remembrance of such gorilla-like monsters, with cunning brains,
shambling gait, hairy bodies, strong teeth, and possibly cannibalistic
tendencies, may be the germ of the ogre in folklore. . . .’ ”
H.G. Wells, Outline of History
What kinds of inferences might this lead to? The following seem likely:
(29) a. Golding is quoting H.G. Wells.
b. Wells is a distinguished figure
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c. Wells is himself quoting Sir Harry Johnston
d. Sir Harry Johnston has some eminence/authority
e. Quoting authority figures is sometimes intended as a way of adding
credibility to an author’s own work.
f. Quoting authority figures is sometimes a preface to arguing against
them or presenting evidence against their views.
Of course, there are many more possibilities. But it is reasonable to suggest that
assumptions such as these will lead to the reader wondering how exactly the novel will
respond to Wells’s epigraph. This is what Hoover suggests. So the epigraph leads us
to read the opening sections of the book (and the book as a whole) with a view to
finding out whether Golding endorses or opposes Wells’s view. As Hoover points out, it
soon becomes clear that the aim is to oppose these views. The effect of the epigraph
then is not to guide us towards one interpretation but to raise questions about possible
interpretations and encourage us to read the novel with a view to finding out what kind
of response to Well’s quote it represents.
Hoover mentions the covers of three different editions of the book. The one he
first remembers reading had:
‘a picture of a naked, beetle-browed man squatting in front of
a fire’
(Hoover 1999: 1)
Another:
 ‘trumpets Golding’s name on a white background in inch-high
gold and brown letters just below the promotional “Nobel
Laureate for Literature” (quarter-inch black letters)’; below
that, in smaller, three-quarter-inch dark green letters, is the
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title ... below the title, a stark black stone ax rests in a bunch
of flowers.’
(Hoover 1999: 1)
Finally, he mentions what he considers an ‘even more remarkable’ cover, namely the
‘tan-grey jacket of the first British edition’ where:
‘below the title and the author’s name is a cream-coloured
suggestion of a forest scene with a standing human-stag in
the middle. The stag has large antlers, and its human hands
and feet are clearly visible, as are what seem to be male sex
organs. Parts of its body and the tips of its ears are red, and
its beady eyes are ringed with red. On the spine are a stag’s
head and earth-mother figures with large breasts and bellies’.
(Hoover 1999: 1-2)
The influence of the various features of these covers will be even less determinate than
the effects of the epigraph. The first, the picture of the ‘naked, beetle-browed man’ will
presumably suggest that we access fairly stereotypical contextual assumptions about
‘cavemen’ or versions of our ancestors. How specific these assumptions are will
depend on how much knowledge an individual reader has about Neanderthal and other
species. Golding himself had read widely on this at the time he wrote the book. In an
interview published in 1970, he said:
‘When I wrote The Inheritors, I had read about all there was to
read [on archaeology]. In fact, if you found a contradiction
between Neanderthal man as he is now known and
Neanderthal man as I wrote him, my guess is you will find that
it has been discovered since ... I could be caught out on this
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one, but I would guess my knowledge of Neanderthal man
was about as wide as it could be for an amateur at that time’.
(Golding reported in Biles 1970: 106-107)
So most readers will be much less well informed than Golding was and there will be
considerable variation from reader to reader. A more important contrast, though, is
between the assumptions that will be accessible to readers who have seen this image
on the cover of the book and those who have not.
The second cover discussed by Hoover draws attention to the credentials of the
author, well-known as he is and now officially recognised as a Nobel Laureate. This will
encourage us to approach the book as a serious, literary work and adjust our
interpretation accordingly. The image of the axe among the flowers suggests notions of
contrast, between nature and human-made tools, beauty and function, and so on.
There is, of course, a two-way relationship here. Our interpretation of the image will
affect our interpretation of the book. At the same time, our interpretation of the book will
affect our interpretation of the image. The more complex imagery on the third example
will have more complex effects. The group of images will themselves raise interpretive
challenges and have a complex interpretation of their own. The interaction between
this and interpretations of the book will also be quite complex.
Analyses of the effects of the cover design may exploit ideas about the
relationship between words and images and multimodality such as those originally
proposed by Barthes (1977) and developed in later work by a number of authors (for
discussion, see Kress 2001 and van Leeuwen 2005).
There is a much wider range of assumptions we might have in mind before
reading texts and which will affect interpretations. Other factors include the book’s
physical location in bookshops and its perceived relationship to other texts,
assumptions about the author, about the cultural context, and so on. Explaining these
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can be seen as an application of pragmatics focusing on the effects of particular sets of
contextual assumptions while inferring meanings from the text.
5.3 Global inferences
Alongside local inferences about specific parts of the book, readers will also make
inferences about the book as a whole. A wide range of kinds of inferences are
possible, including about the author’s intentions in writing it, about the extent to which
these have been realised, about its moral or political implications, about any argument
it might be seen as making directly or indirectly. Some readers will also make
inferences which will not be accessible to many or even any other readers. I might, for
example, make inferences about which of my friends will like it. When I read the book, I
decided that some people I know would certainly not want to read it because I knew
the disturbing aspects would outweigh the positive impact it might have for them. Two
notions which seem relevant here are the distinction drawn within Relevance Theory
(Sperber and Wilson 1986) between ‘implications’ and ‘implicatures’ and the distinction
drawn by Furlong (1996) between ‘spontaneous’ and ‘non-spontaneous’
interpretations.
Implications are conclusions which follow from one or more premises.
Implicatures are the subset of these which are intentionally communicated. Suppose
that I know that my friend Robbie is a big fan of the pop group Belle and Sebastian and
then a friend of mine who doesn’t know Robbie tells me:
(30) Belle and Sebastian are playing at Brixton Academy this Saturday
Then an implication of (30) is:
(31) Robbie would like to go to the concert at Brixton Academy this Saturday
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This cannot be an implicature because the speaker does not know Robbie or that he
likes Belle and Sebastian. Suppose, on the other hand, that the speaker of (30) knows
Robbie, knows that he likes Belle and Sebastian and knows that Robbie is about to
visit me in London for the weekend. As long as I realise all of these assumptions (and
believe that the speaker thinks that I can access them) then (31) will be an implicature
of the utterance, i.e. I will decide that the speaker intends to communicate (31) to me.
In principle, then, we can divide the conclusions a reader draws into those for which
the author is responsible (implicatures) and those which the author could not have
envisaged (non-communicated implications). The implicatures are a subset of the
implications so all of the implicatures will, of course, also be implications. One way of
describing the task of interpreting any utterance is to say that it involves accessing
implications of the utterance and deciding which of these implications are also
implicatures. Often, the distinction is difficult to draw and this is particularly true of more
creative utterances, including literary or other artistic texts.
This distinction can be applied when considering the difference between what is
communicated to readers by the author of a text and what is communicated by
characters to each other. Clark (1996) points out that what is a mere implication of the
utterance of a character or a description of a character’s behaviour may simultaneously
be an implicature communicated by the author to readers. The distinction can also be
relevant when considering literary interpretation since implications may be relevant
even when not intended by the author, in both literary and non-literary communication.
Another relevant distinction is the one drawn by Furlong (1996) between
‘spontaneous’ and ‘non-spontaneous’ interpretations. A spontaneous interpretation is
the kind of interpretation we are likely to arrive at in everyday communication. It
involves looking at the evidence provided by an utterance, seeking an interpretation
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and stopping when a plausible interpretation has been found. If, for example, you tell
me that:
(32) There’s a bus strike today.
A typical spontaneous interpretation will lead me to infer perhaps the following range of
implicatures and probably not much more:
(33) a. There will be no busses running in town today.
b. Anyone who is planning to take the bus will need to make another
plan
c. Other modes of transport will be more heavily used.
d. The kids might be late home from school.
e. It was helpful to tell me.
Such a range of implicatures is surely enough to support the assumption that your
utterance justified the effort involvesd in processing it.
A non-spontaneous interpretation will go further, trying to gather all possible
evidence and build as comprehensive an interpretation as possible. A non-
spontaneous interpretation in an everyday context might lead to questions about the
motives of the speaker, why exactly they might have said this, and so on. Or it might
treat the utterance as if it were literary or artistic, imagining it as the first line of a poem
or song or story, focusing on the sound qualities, etc. With a literary text, of course,
part of the motivation is often to provide the basis for rich literary interpretations. In the
case of The Inheritors, Golding provides material for very rich interpretive work. Here
are just a few possible lines along which a literary interpretation might be developed.
Hoover suggests the possibility of developing an economic/Marxist or a feminist
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analysis. Fish (1973: 128-129) attributes to Halliday (1971) a Darwinian reading on
which the ‘inferior’ people are being replaced by the ‘superior’ new people. He
suggests that this is arbitrary and that:
‘Given the evidence, at least as he marshals it, the way seems
equally open to an Edenic rather than a Darwinian reading of
the novel ... The triumph of the “new people” would then be a
disaster, the beginning of the end ....’
(Fish 1973: 128)
In fact, it is not obvious that Halliday is suggesting a ‘Darwinian’ reading of the novel as
a whole. The ‘Edenic’ reading seems much more salient (for an insightful discussion
showing how the text provides evidence for a range of readings, see Kinkead-Weekes
and Gregor, 2002: 48-98). There is evidence to support the Darwinian reading
inasmuch as that the new people are in some senses better adapted than the people.,
There is stronger evidence for the notion that the arrival of the new people is a tragedy,
and not just for the people themselves. Toolan (1990: 15-16) points out that it is
possible to argue that both the Darwinian and the Edenic reading ‘are supported by the
grammatical contrasts Halliday notes’. Hoover (1999: 21-22) echoes this view and
points out that Halliday was doubtful about using the linguistic analysis to support an
interpretation in the way attributed to him by Fish.
Of course, developing and discussing non-spontaneous interpretations requires
considerable time and space. In fact, a sense of completion would be a
disappointment. As Furlong suggests, such discussion can be understood as a kind of
applied pragmatics, exploring the various kinds of evidence for deriving conclusions
and combining them into an overall interpretation.
Discussion of such global inferences considers evidence from many sources,
including not only the structure of the plot, the natures of the characters, specific local
inferences and other evidence supplied by the text. It might also focus on non-textual
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evidence such as information about the author, the historical context, and so on. The
next section considers what we can discover about the text by comparing the kinds of
inferential processes which different parts of the text give rise to.
5.4 The relevance of inference
One striking aspect of the text which has not been commented on in previous work is a
salient difference in the experience of making inferences while reading different
passages of the text. This section considers how we interpret four passages and then
considers differences among them. The first two passages are from the first section
where the third person narrator reflects Lok’s mind style. These are the very beginning
of the text and the passage where one of the new people fires a poisoned arrow from a
bow at Lok. The third is from the section where the narrator has a detached, quasi-
scientific point of view. The fourth is the opening of the final section where the point of
view shifts to that of the new people. All readers will notice the different points of view
of these passages and they have been commented on in much if not all written
discussions of the book. What has not been commented on explicitly is the different
experience of inferring meanings for each part. One way to begin to explore this is to
consider the kinds of intuitions readers have when reading the book.
Perhaps the strongest intuition readers have, reflected in all discussion of the
book I have seen, is of the contrast between the experiences of reading the first
section (pages 1-216), the second section (pages 216-222) and the third and final
section (pages 223-233). The first section is very difficult to process and there is a
constant sense of uncertainty about what exactly is happening. Kinkead-Weekes and
Gregor (1964, 2002) address this when discussing the ‘difficulty’ of the book. In
emphasising the importance of the experience of reading the first section of the book,
they refer to our ‘intellectual frustration at being confronted with the apparently
unintelligible’ (Kinkead-Weekes and Gregor 2002: 49). This experience is also
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addressed by Halliday (1971) when discussing the marked nature of ‘Language A’ and
by Fowler (1977: 103-113) when discussing the difficulties of understanding Lok’s mind
style. Most discussions of the style of the book focus on the first section which is
markedly different from other texts. The second section moves to an objective
detached perspective where things are described in a very matter of fact way and we
look at Lok from a different, ‘neutral’, point of view, Section three represents a dramatic
shift as the narrator now seems to think ‘like us’. The mind style now is unmarked
compared to other texts but marked compared to the rest of this book. It is now easy to
follow what is happening and my own intuition was of suddenly making a large number
of inferences at once. I could ‘see’ what was going on, could understand the action and
the motivations of the new person, Tuami, whose point of view the narration now takes
on. I could read more quickly and as I read lots of thoughts raced through my mind,
including very disturbing thoughts about how close the new people are to us. This was
made more disturbing by the freshness of the tragedy which happened to Lok and the
people.
The contrast between these passages is captured to some extent by Halliday’s
and Hoover’s analyses of the language and by Fowler’s notion of ‘mind style’. But part
of the effect can be captured by thinking about the nature of inferential processes when
reading the three sections. Just as with jokes and examples such as Bob Dylan’s and
Tony Snow’s utterances in (5) and (6) above, we become more aware of the nature of
inferential processes we are making at the different stages of reading. Salient
differences in the inferential processes are an important part of our experience of the
text and there is more to be said about the three sections than just that there is a
different mind style in each case.
There is no space here for a detailed account of the inferential processes at each
stage, and there are important passages not mentioned here, but we can get some
indication of the differences by adapting Wilson and Sperber’s (2004: 616) schematic
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outline presented in figure 2 above to provide informal representations of some of the
likely inferential processes of readers of the four passages. Figures 4 to 7 present
outlines. Rather than focusing on how semantic representations are fleshed out, these
represent conclusions readers might be hypothesising at each stage and unresolved
questions which remain to be answered. Of course, this is quite an informal
methodology but it does suggest something about the nature of the contrasts.
[ FIGURES 4 TO 7 HERE]
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Sentence just read Current hypotheses Unresolved Questions
Lok was running as fast as
he could.
Lok must be a male character in
the novel. It’s an exotic name. Lok
is running as fast as Lok can.
What kind of
character/creature/person
is Lok? Is he an earlier
human, e.g.
Neanderthal?
His head was down and he
carried his thorn bush
horizontally for balance and
smacked the drifts of vivid
buds aside with his free
hand.
Lok’s head is down and he is
running using a thorn bush and
smacking aside buds. Lok is in a
natural environment
What is a thorn bush
exactly?
Liku rode him laughing, one
hand clutched in the
chestnut curls that lay on
his neck and down his
spine, the other holding the
little Oa tucked under his
chin.
Liku is riding on Lok’s back. Liku
must be a young human. Lok has
hair running down his back. Liku is
quite skilful if holding on with just
one hand.
What is an Oa?
Lok’s feet were clever. Lok’s feet are clever. Is this a metaphor?
They saw. Lok’s feet can see. This must be a
metaphor.
Does it mean more than
that he is a skilful
runner/athlete?
They threw him round the
displayed roots of the
beeches, leapt when a
puddle of water lay across
the trail.
Lok’s feet are throwing him round
beech roots and leaping over
puddles.
Is this more than a
metaphor to say that Lok
is a skilful runner?
Liku beat his belly with her
feet.
Liku beats Lok’s belly with her feet.
“Faster! Faster!” Liku is crying out for Lok to move
faster.This is how a
twentieth/twenty-first century child
might call out like this.
His feet stabbed, he
swerved and slowed.
Lok’s feet stabbed. Now Lok is the
one who swerves and slows rather
than his feet.
Is this a metaphor for a
sudden stop? Is the
switch to ‘he’ as a subject
anything other than just
moving away from the
metaphor?
Now they could hear the
river that lay parallel but
hidden to their left
Lok and Liku can hear the river
behind whatever is hiding it to their
left. Presumably, it is hidden by
trees and/or bushes or other plants.
The beeches opened, the
bush went away and they
were in the little patch of flat
mud where the log was.
The beeches ‘open’, the bush ‘goes
away’. They ‘are’ in the flat patch of
mud (rather than they ‘stood’ or
‘moved into’).
Is this a metaphor for
Lok’s and Liku’s point of
view? Is the aim to be
cinematic? Is the last
clause just a statement or
is it suggesting that they
have less conscious
control over their actions
than we’d expect?
“There, Liku.” Lok is saying ‘there’ to Liku. Does this mean ‘we are
there’? Or something is
over there? Or ‘look over
there’? Or something
else?
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over there? Or ‘look over
there’? Or something
else?
The onyx marsh water was
spread before them,
widening into the river.
The water is onyx coloured. ‘Onyx’
is quite a sophisticated word to
use. The marsh water must be
stagnant. They are at a marsh near
the beginning of a river.
The trail along by the river
began again on the other
side on ground that rose
until it was lost in the trees.
The trail they have followed carries
on up into some trees on the other
side of the marsh/river.
Lok, grinning happily, took
two paces towards the river
and stopped.
Lok is happy to be there but stops
after taking two steps forward.
Is something wrong?
The grin faded and his
mouth opened till the lower
lip hung down.
Lok’s grin fades and his mouth
opens and his lip moves down. So
it seems something is wrong.
Describing his facial movements
like this is not unusual but it
connects with other earlier choices
where the description suggests that
Lok’s body parts are doing things
themselves rather than being
controlled by Lok.
Does this suggest Lok
does not have control
over his own mouth?
Liku slid to his knee then
dropped to the ground.
Liku slides down to Lok’s knee and
onto the ground.
She put the little Oa’s head
to her mouth and looked
over her.
Liku puts the Oa’s head in her
mouth and looks over it.
Is the Oa a doll?
Lok laughed uncertainly. Lok laughs uncertainly. Is he confused? Is this a
nervous laugh? (Since it
seems to follow
something that isn’t
funny). Is something
disturbing him?
“The log has gone away.” Lok says that ‘the log has gone
away’. Again, an inanimate object
is doing something itself. The log
not being there is a surprise to Lok.
Why isn’t it there? Why is
this bad? Could someone
or something have
moved it? Is Lok a bit
naive/innocent? Is this
ominous? Could
something or someone
have moved the log?
Why doesn’t this occur to
Lok?
Figure 4. Schematic outline of hypotheses and questions formed while reading the
opening of the novel (Golding 1955: 11-12).
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Sentence just read Current hypotheses Unresolved Questions
The bushes twitched again. The bushes twitched again. Lok
thinks of the bushes as moving
by themselves. We know one of
the new people is moving them,
perhaps spying, perhaps
planning something worse such
as an attack.
What kind of creature is
looking at Lok? Is Lok in
danger?
Lok steadied by the tree and
gazed.
Lok steadies himself by the tree
and gazes across.
What will he see? Is it
safe just to stand there?
Should he hide?
A head and a chest faced him,
half-hidden.
He can see a head and a chest.
We are worrying about what the
other person is about to do. Lok
is just observing and not
thinking about the intentions of
the other person.
What is the other person
going to do? Is he going
to attack Lok? Why
doesn’t Lok run away?
Does he not realise the
danger?
There were white bone things
behind the leaves and hair.
Something on the other
person’s face looks like ‘white
bone things’ to Lok.
What are the white bone
things? Paint or makeup
of some kind?
The man had white bone
things above his eyes and
under the mouth so that his
face was longer than face
should be.
Something on the other
person’s face looks like ‘white
bone things’ to Lok and his face
looks too long.
What are the white bone
things? Paint or makeup
of some kind? Could the
‘bone things’ just be his
skin? Is his face a
different shape from
Lok’s? Maybe he looks
more like us and less like
Lok?
The man turned sideways in
the bushes and looked at Lok
along his shoulder.
He has turned sideways and is
looking along his shoulder.
Why is he looking at Lok
like this? Could he be
aiming?
A stick rose upright and there
was a lump of bone in the
middle.
A stick appears upright with a
lump of bone in the middle of it.
Is the other person raising
the stick rather than it just
raising itself? What is a
stick with a lump of bone?
Could the bone be a
hand? Is it a bow?
Lok peered at the stick and the
lump of bone and the small
eyes in the bone things over
the face.
He’s seeing a stick with a lump
of bone in the middle and eyes.
Could the ‘lump of bone’
be a hand? Holding a
bow? Is the other person
aiming at Lok?
Suddenly Lok understood that
the man was holding the stick
out to him but neither he nor
Lok could reach across the
river.
Lok thinks he’s reaching to him.
But it’s more likely he’s aiming.
Is Lok about to be hit by
an arrow?
He would have laughed if it
were not for the echo of the
screaming in his head.
Lok is confused since he finds
this comical on its own terms
but is disturbed because of his
very disturbing recent memory.
What exactly is Lok
thinking and feeling?
The stick began to grow
shorter at both ends.
This sounds like a bow would
look as the string is pulled back
before firing at the person
looking at it (i.e. its target).
Is an arrow about to be
fired at Lok?
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looking at it (i.e. its target).
Then it shot out to full length
again.
Definitely what a bow would do
if fired.
Has an arrow been fired?
The dead tree by Lok’s ear
acquired a voice.
A noise from the tree. Again,
typically of Lok, described as if
the tree were alive.
Did the arrow hit the tree?
“Clop!” Sounds like an arrow from the
bow hitting the tree. Interesting
that it’s told as if there were
gaps between discrete events,
as if it were all happening
slower than it would. It’s
worrying that Lok doesn’t
understand what’s happening.
Did the arrow hit the tree?
Is Lok about to die?
His ears twitched and he
turned to the tree.
Again his ears twitch as if
separate entities. Lok is in great
danger but doesn’t seem to
realise it.
Why doesn’t he react
more urgently? Does he
not understand what’s
happening? Is he about to
die?
By his face there had grown a
twig: a twig that smelt of other,
and of goose, and of the bitter
berries that Lok’s stomach told
him he must not eat.
This must be Lok’s point of
view. He thinks a twig has
grown in the tree very quickly.
It’s ‘by his face’ so it must have
only just missed him. The
smells suggest goose and
poisonous berries.
Is this a poisonous arrow?
This twig had a white bone at
the end.
This bone must be some kind
of arrowhead.
What is the other person
doing? Will he fire the
bow again?
There were hooks in the bone
and sticky brown stuff hung in
the crooks.
The hooks must be there to
make it hard to remove from its
target. The sticky stuff must be
poison. Lok has had a narrow
escape!
His nose examined this stuff
and did not like it.
Again his nose acts separately
from him. It doesn’t like it,
which means it smells bad.
He smelled along the shaft of
the twig.
He is smelling it. Now Lok is
acting. But he is investigating
instead of realising the urgency
of what is going on and acting
on it.
The leaves on the twig were
red feathers and reminded him
of goose.
The arrow must have goose
feathers on it as flights. These
people make tools in a more
‘advanced’ or sophisticated way
than the people do.
He was lost in a generalised
astonishment and excitement.
Lok is absolutely amazed
because this is not like anything
he’s ever seen. He does not
understand that the other
person is trying to kill him.
What will happen? Is Lok
too innocent to survive
meeting the new people?
Figure 5. Schematic outline of hypotheses and questions formed while reading the
‘bow and arrow’ passage (Golding 1955: 106)
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Sentence just read Current hypotheses Unresolved Questions
The red creature stood on the
edge of the terrace and did
nothing.
‘The red creature’ must be
Lok. We’ve switched to a fully
third person point of view. Lok
is standing on the edge of the
terrace.
The hollow log was a dark
spot on the water towards the
place where the sun had
gone down.
The hollow log is off towards
the sunset.
The air in the gap was clear
and blue and calm.
The air is clear, blue and calm.
There was no noise at all now
except for the fall, for there
was no wind and the green
sky was clear.
The only noise is the fall. It’s
windless and a clear night.
The red creature turned to the
right and trotted slowly
towards the far end of the
terrace.
Lok turns and ‘trots’ to the far
end of the terrace. ‘trots’
suggests movement like an
animal.
Water was cascading down
the rocks beyond the terrace
from the melting ice in the
mountains.
The ice in the mountains is
melting down the rocks beyond
the terrace.
The river was high and flat
and drowned the edge of the
terrace.
The river is high and flat
completely covering the edge
of the terrace.
There were long scars in the
earth and rock where the
branches of a tree had been
dragged past by the water.
The earth and rock have been
scratched by a tree being
dragged past by the water.
The red creature came
trotting back to a dark hollow
in the side of the cliff where
there was evidence of
occupation.
Lok is trotting back to the
hollow in the cliff. This narrator
acts as if knowing nothing
about what has happened
before.
None.
Figure 6. Schematic outline of hypotheses and questions formed while reading the
opening of the ‘detached narrator’ section of the novel (Golding 1955: 216-217)
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Sentence just read Current hypotheses Unresolved Questions
Tuami sat in the stern of the
dug-out, the steering paddle
under his left arm.
Tuami is sitting in his boat
steering. He uses technical
terms.
There was plenty of light and
the patches of salt no longer
looked like holes in the skin
sail.
It’s quite light and he notices
how the salt on the sail looks
different now. He understands
what he’s seeing clearly and
knows the difference between
appearances and reality.
He thought bitterly of the
great square sail they had left
bundled up in that last mad
hour among the mountains;
for with that and the breeze
through the gap he need not
have endured these hours of
strain.
He’s annoyed that they left a
useful sail behind which would
have made things much easier.
Tuami thinks like us.
He need not have sat all night
wondering whether the
current would beat the wind
and bear them back to the fall
while the people or as many
as were left of them slept
their collapsed sleep.
He is thinking about what it was
like to struggle with the wind
against the current all night and
how much easier it would have
been with the other sail.
He doesn’t know how many of
the people there are left.
Still, they had moved on, the
walls of rock folding back until
this lake became so broad
that he had been able to find
no transits for judging their
motion but sat, guessing, with
the mountains looming over
the flat water and his eyes
red with the tears of strain.
He thinks back over what
happened. He describes the
rock ‘folding back; and the lake
‘becoming broad’, similar to
Lok’s way of thinking of
inanimates as acting, but this
time it is metaphor rather than
literal.
Now he stirred a little for the
rounded bilge was hard and
the pad of leather that many
steersmen had moulded to a
comfortable seat was lost on
the slope up from the forest.
Again he’s acting and thinking
about what he’s doing. And
thinking about the history of the
leather seat. And using more
technical terms. These people
must travel by water often.
He could feel the slight
pressure transmitted to his
forearm along the loom of the
paddle and knew that if he
were to trail his hand over the
side the water would tinkle
against the palm and heap up
over his wrist.
Thinking about what he’s doing
and what would happen if he
put his arm in the water. This
passage is much easier than
the other passages and shows
that he thinks like us.
None.
Figure 7. Schematic outline of hypotheses and questions formed while reading the
opening of the final section of the novel (Golding 1955: 233)
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The most obvious difference is that the first two passages leave a number of
questions unresolved for readers. As we read, we notice a number of things we don’t
yet know and we have to keep these questions in mind as we read on. This places a
significant cognitive burden on the reader. There are no obvious unresolved questions
raised by the passages from the second and third sections represented in Figures 6
and 7. This means that readers will find it easier to process the passages and that they
will be more readily able to make further inferences about the passages. These two
sections also answer some of the earlier questions. The detached narrator in the
second section describes Lok as ‘the red creature’ and describes his movement as
‘trotting’. This fits with the hypothesis that he is a Neanderthal as well as encouraging
us to think of him as animal-like. There is an interesting contrast between this external
view and the more internal view we had when we shared Lok’s perspective in the first
section. There is also something emotive about simultaneously a ‘red creature’ from a
detached point of view and being able to empathise with him.
The more dramatic effect of the final section comes from the shift to the mind
style of the new people and of Tuami in particular. As well as being able to process
quickly, we now move into the perspective of the new people and, of course, we feel
quite at home with this point of view. We are able quickly to follow what is going on
while simultaneously thinking about what Tuami is thinking, about what has happened
in the rest of the book from the point of view of the new people, about the fact that
these are a variety of homo sapiens and so closer to ourselves, about the implicatures
this generates about our own nature and our impact on the world, and so on. This
section also ties in with global inferences about the overall interpretation of the book,
including about our nature and about evil, and about how ‘progress’ and evolutionary
‘success’ are connected with evil. There is an interesting contrast between a positive
sense of being ‘liberated’ as processing becomes easier and negative implicatures
about our nature and our effect on the world. The overall effect is that the experience of
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reading the final section is dramatic, exciting and disturbing. All of this is partly
captured by referring to linguistic differences and to mind style. But a recognition of the
sudden ease and speed of inferential processes helps to explain important aspects of
our experience of reading the book. In particular, it helps to capture what Kinkead-
Weekes and Gregor have in mind when they say that Golding is not aiming just to tell
us about what is happening in the story but wants to actually manipulate our
experience as well. Finally, focusing on specific inferences helps us to understand how
Halliday’s identification of lack of linguistic agency goes alongside inferences about
lack of agency which we derive from the meaning of what is said. This is a more
specific way of confirming that the linguistic facts are relevant to our interpretation of
the book.
6 Conclusion
Clearly, we cannot understand a text without making inferences and so in principle
stylistic analyses should always consider the inferences made by audiences. But there
are practical considerations which make it tempting to put this part of an analysis to
one side and so risk missing important facts about texts and their interpretations. This
paper has considered some of the ways in which an account of inferential processes
can contribute to stylistic analysis. While it is not practical to attempt to describe and
explain the details of every inferential process involved in understanding a text, there is
a lot be discovered by exploring inferential processes and there are cases where the
nature of the inferential processes is itself salient and contributes to readers’
interpretations and experience of the text.
Notes
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